Cultural Turns, Accidental Nations and Christian Nationalism:

The Development of a Nationalist Consciousness in Modern Finland and Hungary

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Abstract:

This paper has two main goals: to examine “cultural turn” in recent literature on nationalism and examine the development of nationalism in late 19th and early 20th-century Hungary. The initial section of the paper discusses the development of the historiography of nationalism and the internal divisions within the contemporary scholarship on the so-called “cultural turn”. Additionally, examples in Finland and Hungarian history do not ultimately connect with most of the theories proposed by the turn-era scholars. The ultimate conclusion is that it is not possible to construct a single, unified narrative of this “cultural turn.” The development of a Finnish scholarship of nationalism and the role of personally involved authors is discussed, and two major aspects of Finnish nationalism are discussed: the ways in which the circumstances in which Finland was created and its people defined the nation ex nihilo and the alternatively combative and friendly relationship Finland had with the Russian power. The examination of the scholarship on Hungarian nationalism revealed a similar preponderance of personally-involved figures as historians, and other dominant themes within the (a pronounced Hungarian sense of historicity, somewhat in contrast to the Finns, and a relative ambivalence about the role of religion in Hungarian history). The resulting conclusion is that the study of the development of nationalism in Finland and Hungary bears some lessons for future studies of nationalism in smaller polities located between larger powers, but that certain aspects of Finnish and Hungarian history are not applicable to other states.

Main Paper:

Finland and Hungary underwent a series of struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries. Finland, after its separation from Sweden in 1809, developed a national consciousness in a period of Russian control, gained its independence during the collapse of the Russian Empire in the 1910s, and fought the bloody Winter War and World War II with the Soviet Union. Hungary underwent a similar development of nationalist consciousness, beginning with the unsuccessful rising of Louis Kossuth in 1848 and culminating in independence in 1918 and a subsequent attempt at a Communist revolution. Both nations underwent nationalist revivals, and both were situated between more powerful and culturally influential powers, most notably Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union. These two factors played a major role in shaping the histories of these two nations, and in illuminating broader processes within their larger neighbors. A historical study of Finland and Hungary and a historiographical study of the “cultural turn” in the study of nationalism provide several insights into several aspects of Finnish and Hungarian history and of broader processes in other similar countries. Before examining the development of nationalism proper, however, reviewing the contemporary literature on nationalism provides a helpful background for exploring the means by which nationalism comes to form in certain nations.

There exists a traditional narrative of the “cultural turn” in the scholarship on nationalism, a narrative that does not adequately explain certain aspects of the turn. According to this narrative, scholarship on nationalism before the turn, i.e. scholarship from before the late 1960s, was dominated by two figures: Carleton Hayes and Hans Kohn. Kohn’s scholarship in particular stands as an exemplar of what the pre-turn scholarship is represented as: in his *The Idea of Nationalism*, Kohn argues that nationalism is a “state of mind,” a collective consciousness developed through historical and political processes amongst people in a certain contiguous and compact territorial area. This mindset, according to Kohn, was present amongst ancient civilizations, i.e. the Greeks and Romans, but only manifested itself as modern political
nationalism in the Enlightenment due to the development of the centralized state under an absolute monarchy.\(^3\) This scholarship, which tends to assume *a priori* the existence of immemorial nations which can form states, was challenged by a series of works that came out in the late 1960s through the early 1980s.\(^4\) The most notable of these works are Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, and Miroslav Hroch’s *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*. Several other contemporary scholars also wrote new monographs on nationalism, including Eric Hobsbawm’s *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* and the various works of Anthony D. Smith, notably his *Theories of Nationalism*. Although these authors had very different conceptions of what nationalism truly was, they all (more or less) argued that nationalism had a purely intellectual basis and was constructed by “nations” that did not possess the historic and essential quality that these new nations claimed they possessed. Gellner and Anderson in particular place this formation of the natural consciousness in the 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) century as a response to certain cultural and economic factors. Additionally, most of these authors do not argue that the nation is an entity that has existed since time immemorial: rather, they argue, all nations are invented mental constructs that are used and abused by various factions for their own ends. This, then, is the traditional narrative of the cultural turn: outdated, primordial treatments of nationalism are replaced in the 1970s and 1980s by intellectual, post-structuralist conceptions of the nation-state. However, this narrative has three major issues that prevent it from totally explaining the development of the scholarship on nationalism.

The first issue with the traditional narrative is that each work of the cultural turn-era scholarship displays a slightly different understanding of what nationalism actually is. Ernest Gellner’s argument is based on the premise that the capitalist economy requires that a certain modern educational system, one that creates universal literacy and a modular workforce, in order to sustain the perpetual growth engendered by modern capitalism.\(^5\) Gellner’s argument is economically deterministic, without being totally Marxist in nature.\(^6\) Anderson’s argument is partially economic, insofar as the developing capitalist economy combined with the developing print industry to create the preconditions for American colonists to develop nationalism.\(^7\) However, Anderson does not place the ideological conception of nationalism as coming after the economic forces created the system; rather, Anderson argues that they originated at the same time, and places the start of the nationalist process with the American and Bolivarian revolutions, rather than (as Gellner does) the Industrial Revolution.\(^8\) Hroch’s analysis is based on applying theories of communication and the spread of ideas, partially like Anderson, but Hroch develops a semi-rigid hierarchy of phases of nationalist development and the possible revolutionary paths they might take.\(^9\) Hobsbawm’s analysis explicitly builds off of Gellner and Anderson’s work, but adds components to this analysis—a more Marxist philosophy, an emphasis on mass action, a refutation of committed political nationalism and a deep ambivalence about the success of nationalism as a political philosophy—that do not totally coincide with the theories proposed by the other authors.\(^10\) Anthony Smith, one of the more prolific authors on this topic, has theories that do not completely correlate with anyone else’s: he admits that nations can be conceived of in intellectual turns, but also argues that there are proto-nations called that he dubs *ethnies*, units that have a common historical heritage and culture, that are not completely constructed and do have a long historical heritage.\(^11\) Smith’s analysis finds something of a middle ground between the other thinkers of the cultural turn and the older Hayes-Kohn school, but it is a middle ground that leaves questions open (why are the cultural traits of the *ethnie* not intellectually constructed, as Smith implies the nationalist conception is?) and does not truly accommodate the tenets of
either side. However, even if we were to remove Smith from this group, the remaining scholars have very little in common. All that Anderson, Gellner, Hroch, and Hobsbawm can agree on is that nationalism is an artificial conception from early modern or modern times, and that there are intellectual and economic components driving the process forward. Aside from this blanket statement, there are very few details that unify all of the disparate post-turn scholars together, which renders the idea of a unified post-turn scholarship displacing a pre-turn scholarship (or even the proper selection of which works really make up the cultural turn) impossible to conclusively argue.

The narrative of the cultural turn also ignores some of the issues generated by the earlier era of scholarship. The second issue with this narrative, that no one scholar or narrative can conclusively explain all the processes of nationalism, is an issue that can be explored in more detail in the analysis of Finland and Hungary. The third issue, however, is more immediate: there are elements of the cultural turn scholarship that are clearly evident in pre-turn scholarship. This can range from brief remarks in a broader work, such as A.J.P. Taylor’s comment in his *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918; A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* that “nationalism is an intellectual concept, impossible without literacy,” a concept that could have been taken from Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* roughly three decades before *Nations and Nationalism* was written. However, conceptions of nationalism are not central to Taylor’s work. A work that does more to disrupt this narrative is the essay “What is a Nation?” written by French political theorist Ernest Renan, delivered in 1882. In this essay, Renan argues against an ethnic or linguistic consideration of nationalism and instead argued that the “nation is a soul, a spiritual principle”, a contemporary entity based on the daily intellectual acclamation of the population. Renan, writing almost a century before the cultural turn, anticipates both the intellectual conception of the nation and the specifics of later arguments: Anderson’s discussion of newspapers and print-capitalism as forerunners to modern nationalism owes a great deal to Renan, as Anderson’s analysis of newspapers is essentially a more in-depth analysis of Renan’s “daily plebiscite.” However, there is one thing that makes the cultural turn new and contemporary: the fact that these anticipatory comments are either transitory or not entirely germane to the full text of the work (as in the case of the Taylor example) or only anticipate part of the full “cultural turn” theory. Renan’s essay, while acknowledging that nationalism is essentially constructed, argues that “at the present time, the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even.” This acceptance and promotion of the nation-state is not something that any of the cultural turn authors acknowledge: Anderson and Gellner are, at best, ambivalent about nationalism and the fact that nations are constructed entities, whereas Hobsbawm outright scorns the mixing of intellectual scholarship with political nationalism. In essence, what the scholars of the cultural turn have accomplished is a synthesis: they have taken certain elements and theories from previous works, added their own insights, and thereby created a new conception of nationalism that had not been central to any previous work. In this regard, the turn’s relevance comes not from its modernity, but instead to the way in which the turn-era scholars recombined and adapted past elements into a new scholarship, one that provides us with valuable insights into the nationalist process.

With this exploration of the cultural turn complete, the study of Finnish nationalism can begin. The works on post-independence Finland written and translated into English both before and after this demonstrate a focus on somewhat dry political and diplomatic history at the expense of all else. The scholarship on the post-independence era best exemplifies this trend: the earliest works are memoirs, from Finnish President J.K. Paasikivi, Finnish general Carl
Mannerheim, Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner, and Finnish Ambassador G.A. Gripenberg. Following these first-hand accounts, the most prolific scholar is the English Anthony F. Upton, who has devoted several volumes to the Finnish Revolution, Finnish Civil War, and the Winter War. Upton’s work primarily focuses on political, diplomatic, and military history, and only delves into topics of nationalism when it connects with his broader thesis: for example, Upton discusses Finnish nationalism insofar as it relates to Finnish irredentist desires to take the province of Karelia from the Soviet Union, and how that desire helps lead to the Winter War. The works of Tuomo Polvinen on this era, such as his Between East and West: Finland in International Politics, 1944-1947, fall into this same mold—political and diplomatic history with a narrow focus—even though Polvinen’s work was translated into English in 1986. One of the most recent works on the Winter War, Olli Vehviläinen’s 2002 Between Germany and Russia, offers some arguments that seem partially related to the post-turn scholarship, but generally follows in the same essential mold as Gripenberg, Upton, and Polvinen: he covers nationalism only as it pertains to politics and diplomatic affairs. Vehviläinen’s main innovation is his ability to more efficiently cover the topic and provide evidence (access to Soviet files). Scholarship on the post-independence era tends to heavily focus on the internal and external ramifications of Finnish political decisions, rather than the impact of Finnish nationalism in of itself.

The scholarly work on the earlier period of Finnish statehood, under Russian rule, offers a closer connection with the work of the cultural turn. Most of the works that cover the era of Russian rule (the first time the Finns were organized into a non-Swedish state, a topic that will be explored in further detail below) is mostly covered in general work. However, there are some more topic-specific works, such as William Wilson’s Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland, that do anticipate some of the trends of the cultural turn. Wilson, writing about the Finnish Kalevala epic and its effects on the Finnish people in 1977, constructs a model of cultural diffusion similar to that of Miroslav Hroch, but also makes some limited appeals to the Finnish character and national spirit that are out of character for any of the turn-era scholars, except possibly Anthony Smith. However, the work that best embodies the impact that the cultural turn had on pre-independence studies of Finland is Risto Alapuro’s State and Revolution in Finland. Written in 1988, Alapuro engages heavily with several of the turn-era scholars, most notably applying Gellner and Hroch’s theories (along with those of Thomas Nairn, another turn-era figure) to his largely class-based analysis of the development of the Finnish nation. Later works, such as Tuomo Polvinen’s Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898-1904, also partially connect with some of the turn-era thinkers, but (like Vehviläinen) only in something of an indirect and obverse manner. The scholarly work on the pre-revolutionary era of Finnish history has several direct and indirect conversations with the scholarship on the cultural turn.

In studying the various works on pre- and post-revolutionary Finland, certain themes in Finnish history become apparent. First, there is the recurring idea that the Finnish nation and people have been crafted almost out of nothing. Alapuro quotes Finland expert Edward Thaden in saying that “the existence of a Finnish nation, can be considered an incidental byproduct of wars between Sweden and Russia during the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.” In fact, until their separation from Sweden, the provinces that would later become Sweden did not consider themselves different than what would later be modern Sweden: the Finnish economy was focused on Stockholm, and the Finns did not consider themselves as being particularly separate from the Swedes. Finland was, in essence, created an unintended side-
effect of other issues and had to be defined out of nothing: if the Finns were no longer Swedes, and if they were certainly not Russians, then what could they be? As Alapuro argues, everything that defines the Finnish political situation—the arrangement of the social classes, the political system—is a result of Finland’s unique location between Sweden and Russia and the unique roles that those countries played in Finland.\(^\text{27}\) Wilson’s work is about the Finnish attempt to deal with this perceived lack of historical roots and create an epic that creates a proud Finnish historical tradition—the *Kalevala*. Wilson’s further examination of the development of Finnish folkloric studies and how they helped to formulate Finnish irredentism towards East Karelia (the supposed homeland of those people who preserved the *Kalevala*, and as such an integral component of the Finnish nation) helps show the ways in which attempts to combat this perceived lack of historicity manifested themselves in political ways.\(^\text{28}\) Polvinen’s discussion of Russian Governor-General Nikolai Bobrikov’s attempts to “Russify” Finland illustrates how outside pressure from a larger nation can act as a catalyst to the formation of an internal culture in the affected nation. The scholarship creates a distinct era of Finnish history, from 1809 (the Finnish assumption into the Russian Empire) to 1917 (the Finnish revolution and the establishment of a separate Finnish state), and the ways in which the Finnish state’s lack of recent historical independence helped shape later developments in Finnish politics and culture. The study of Finnish history reveals various responses to a perceived lack of historical roots.

The second theme comes from the post-independence era, and has to do with Russo-Finnish relations. The early period of Russo-Finnish relations was marked by two distinct trends: first, that Finland had to be secured in order to protect St. Petersburg and to project Russian power in the Baltic Sea, and that the Russians, starting with Alexander I, allowed the Finns to maintain their semi-representative government.\(^\text{29}\) The Russians initially assumed that the latter would ensure the former, as the local nobles would keep the frontier secure,\(^\text{30}\) but as time progressed the Russians developed a brand of “conservative nationalism” that required the Finns to be made culturally Russian to ensure their loyalty.\(^\text{31}\) Their attempts, as enacted through Bobrikov, led to the dissolution of the Russo-Finnish relationship and provided a major impetus to the Finnish independence movement. By the 1930s, the Soviets were mistrustful of the Finns, due to the White victory in the Finnish Civil War and the past history of German intervention in Finnish affairs, and were eager to secure the Hanko Peninsula to protect Leningrad from enemy attacks.\(^\text{32}\) Finland’s decisions in this period, however, were heavily based on the decisions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union: the Finns attempted to remain neutral until the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, after which they prepared for an attack until the Winter War and Operation Barbarossa.\(^\text{33}\) The Winter War—in which the Soviets almost but with great difficulty conquered Finland—pushed the Finns to join up with the Nazis, an arrangement that the Finnish government entered into hesitantly.\(^\text{34}\) When the war turned south—as the Nazis were pushed out of Russia and the Finns discovered how hard holding East Karelia would be—the Soviets and Finns concluded a separate peace, an arrangement that was only possible because of the Finnish leadership’s willingness to cooperate with the Soviets and Soviet interests being drawn towards Germany and Eastern Europe.\(^\text{35}\) Finland occupied a unique position within the Eastern European sphere: it was initially critical for Soviet defenses, because of the need to bolster the Hanko Peninsula to secure the Baltic and because of the large Finnish nickel deposits near Murmansk.\(^\text{36}\) However, Finland became a lesser priority towards the end of the war for various reasons: the Winter War showed the Soviets that a full invasion of Finland would be bloody and futile, the Finns were willing to fall under Soviet influence voluntarily, and that the Soviets were more devoted to deploying their resources in the other Eastern European nations
that had been brought into the Soviet sphere after World War II. One of the most notable recurring themes in the historiography of Finnish-Soviet relations is simultaneous Finnish role as the most important and the least important section of the Soviet defensive network.

There are two main trends that become visible in the historiography of Hungary. First, there is a strong trend, even stronger than the similar trend in the historiography of Finland, for native Hungarians in crucial places to contribute to the historical literature. This trend includes the noted early 20th century scholar Oscar Jaszi, who wrote extensively on the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy and the early era of Hungarian democracy, Miklos Horthy, the conservative leader of inter-war Hungary, and Stephen Kertesz, Horthy’s chief representative at the post-WWII peace conferences. Kertesz in particular offers a major contribution to the historiography: he has written several works on the Hungarian peace process and the subsequent Soviet domination, starting in the early 1950s (Diplomacy in a Whirlpool) to the mid-1980s (Between Russia and the West). This trend is not confined to the era immediately after the installation of a Communist government, or to historians focused on post-WWI history: Istvan Deak, author of The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849, was born and lived in Hungary until 1948. One of the major trends of early and middle-era literature on Hungarian history is the heavy presence of personally involved authors.

The other major trend with the historiography of Hungary is the relative ambivalence towards the cultural turn in post-turn scholarship. As mentioned previously, A.J.P. Taylor anticipates some elements of the cultural turn in his The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918; A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary, but his arguments about nationalism are essentially incidental to his main narrative on the decline and fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. This brief foreshadowing of a turn-era idea seems relatively incidental, but further examination of the later scholarship reveals that very few authors directly engage with the thinkers of the cultural turn, even those who deal with the issue of nationalism. The authors writing at the time of the turn or just after are either placing their texts within the contexts of different discourses, such as Andrew Janos in The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945, who is mostly focused on contributing to a post-Marxist discussion on the spread of social politics, and Paul Hanebrink, whose In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism explores the role of religion in the Hungarian conservative nationalism of the early to mid 20th century. The most telling absence of turn-influenced explanations for nationalism is in a series of monographs published by Columbia University Press in the mid-1990s that deal with Hungarian foreign relations and nationalism in the early 20th century. Although the works are all collections of articles from several different scholars, none of them engage directly with the cultural turn scholars: the work on nationalism takes the existence of nationalities for granted and does not go into more specific details about the formation of their nations. The overarching trend appears to be that the various scholars of Hungarian foreign policy and other issues are not interested in the formation of nationalism per se, but more on its after-effects. One could argue, based on the comments from Taylor, that some kind of intellectual conception of nationalism is assumed by scholars, but for the authors of the articles in Glatz’s work, it is not particularly important if the Hungarians or the Serbs imagined their communities or if they existed from the dawn of time: their focus is on the effects of nationalism and the interactions that it begets.

Two main themes in Hungarian history become apparent by examining this evidence. The first is the sense of historicity that seems to pervade Hungarian culture. Istvan Deak, writing in the 1970s, discusses how “generations of Hungarians have lived in the aura” of Louis Kossuth’s 1848 revolution, and idly comments that “in Hungary almost everybody is a
Hanebrink’s explication of “Christian nationalism” shows the ways in which that idea was based on an appeal to Hungarian history, or more specifically, a certain version of that history based on Christian stability and old national traditions. It is this sense of memory that Thomas Sakmyster argues, in *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis 1936-1939*, helped provide an intellectual basis for Hungarian nationalism, historical revisionism and irredentism, and it is this same sense of history that Hanebrink argues that the Hungarians must come to turns with in order to fully participate with the broader European community. This theme can be seen as the counterpart to the discussion of Finland’s relative lack of a historical tradition and their efforts to construct one. Ignoring the various geopolitical factors that distinguish the two nations, it would appear that the nation with a weaker, more artificial sense of historicity (i.e. Finland) had more modest ambitions and fewer nationalist/irredentist goals than the nation with an extremely deep sense of its own history (i.e. Hungary). The study of Hungarian history reveals a deep historicity that pervades both the Hungarian populace and Hungarian political affairs.

The second theme that becomes apparent in the historiography is the relative lack of attention paid to religion in the post-WWI period. Hanebrink is the only author to explore Christianity’s influence in any detail, as seen in his ability to distinguish the Catholic and Calvinist traditions and illustrate the ways in which these groups mistrusted each other but were able to partially compromise on an “ecumenical” Christian nationalism. The only other scholar to discuss religion with any kind of seriousness is one Leslie Laszlo, who contributed articles on the role of Christian churches in the wartime period, after Christian nationalism had (mostly) run its course. Janos, by contrast, dubs this phenomenon “Christian radicalism,” and essentially lumps the Calvinists and Catholics together with his broader class analysis. This trend, to some extent, reflects a contemporary lack of focus on religious factors. For example, none of the cultural turn-era scholars handle religion particularly well: Gellner argues that a dominant religious discourse is mostly confined to pre-industrial society, and Hobsbawm argues that religion does not create nationalist discourses when countries have like-minded religious neighbors. One could use Hroch’s model to explain the spread of religious discourse if one places the religious leaders at Phrase A of Hroch’s structure, but Hroch mostly uses this level for the intelligentsia and non-aligned activists. This theme ties into the historiographical tendency for authors of Hungarian history to have a very sharp focus: Janos’s thesis about the spread of social idea or how they might be impeded, or Sakmyster’s discussion of the Danubian Crisis, do not particularly need Christianity to function. A relative ambivalence about discussing religion within the context of Hungarian history also becomes noticeable following an examination of the scholarship.

The examination of the trends in both the Finnish and Hungarian historiographies reveals several opportunities for future research. Alapuro concludes that Finland’s position within the European sphere is largely unique, due to its geographical location and political and cultural relationships with two larger powers. However, a possible area for future research is to examine what factors—the geography, the largely agricultural and egalitarian nature of the Finnish economy, the interplay between the Swedish traditions and Russian demands—are so unique to Finland that they cannot be used in a comparative study, or are generic enough that they can be used. In the case of Hungary, Hanebrink’s scholarship seems to have opened a somewhat neglected area, that of the serious study of the religious impact on Hungarian politics. *In Defense of Christian Hungary* provides an excellent initial foray into the time period and the role of religion in Hungarian politics, but his work leaves the door open for further studies of the
influence of Catholicism and Calvinism in the 19th century, or specific Catholic or Calvinist figures in the 19th and 20th centuries. The ultimate value of these further studies would be to examine the ways in which smaller countries situated near larger powers interact with each other, and what factors in these countries’ histories impact their relationships. Even though the precise historical situations of Finland and Hungary may not be totally reproducible, further research into certain elements of these states’ history could offer a valuable insight into wider political fields.

Historical research into nationalism and the nationalist process in Finland and Hungary have produced several insights into the historical process. The so-called “cultural turn” has offered several valuable insights into the process of nationalism, but it has not created any new universalizing narratives about the nationalist process. Studies of Finnish history reveal that the Finns occupy a somewhat unique place in the geopolitical arena and a lack of a Finnish sense of history. By contrast, the studies of Hungary reveal a nation that has a much stronger sense of its own history and a lack of study into the role of religion in its politics. Although both Finland and Hungary do not have universal appeal to scholars in of themselves, the insights offered by further research into Finland, Hungary, and the scholarship of the cultural turn will provide more information into the role of nationalism and foreign relations in small states.

Notes


3 Ibid., 19-20.

4 Hobsbawm, 3.


6 Ibid., 95.


8 Ibid., Gellner 39-41.

9 Hroch and Smith’s views are outlined in their articles from Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 63-67.
Hobsbawm 9-11, Gellner 124 and 126 displays a certain contempt of the major nationalist thinkers—they believed that “if one of them had fallen, others would have stepped into his place,” both in the revolutionary and historical sense (124), but Anderson is generally more sympathetic to nationalist thinkers and their historical value.

Eley and Suny, 108-110.

At this point, it is enough to say that each author has an area of expertise (Gellner for the Western European democracies, Anderson for the North and South American nations, and Hroch for smaller Eastern European polities) where their theories work very well, but certain areas that present major challenges to their respective understandings of nationalism. Gellner tends to deal in generalities, but see Anderson 46 and Chapter 4, “Creole Pioneers” for his emphasis on North American movements; Hroch 64-66 tends to deal with smaller, mostly Eastern European countries.

Taylor, 30.

Renan’s lecture is in Eley and Suny, 48-50, 52-53.

Anderson, 22-36.

Eley and Suny, 53.

Anderson 6, Gellner 129-130, Hobsbawm 12-13


Vehviläinen argues that Finnish nationalism pushed for the taking of Karelia, but the economic distress in East Karelia and the cultural differences between the two areas contributed to Finnish disillusionment with the conflict and led to Finnish efforts to withdraw from the conflict—see Olli Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia, trans. Gerard McAlester (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 104-108. This is, in some ways, an obverse of Gellner’s argument that nationalism requires a dominant “high culture” and strong economy to flourish—even if Vehviläinen does not explicitly cite Gellner, this comment suggests the cultural turn’s indirect influence.

Vehviläinen, 43, 89, 91-93.

William Wilson, Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1976), x-xi., see Suny 64-65 for Hroch’s models. It should be noted that Hroch’s major work, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, was compiled
from two articles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but only translated into English in 1985. This suggests that Wilson’s creation of a similar model fits into the third objection raised earlier to the traditional narrative of the cultural turn, as Wilson’s work predates the rest of the major cultural turn-era theorists by a few years.


24 Polvinen’s discussion of Finnish development and entropic distribution relate back to Gellner’s ideas (278), and the entire Bobrikov narrative (a Russian commander takes control of Finland and, though his actions, helps to galvanize the Finns’ desire for an independent state) is reminiscent of Anderson’s discussion of North American revolutionaries and the trans-Atlantic networks of power (Anderson 53-60), but on a much smaller scale and without the “creole” element that makes up a good section of Anderson’s essential argument.

25 Alapuro, 19.

26 Ibid. 24-25, 52-59.

27 Ibid., 274-275.

28 Wilson, 147-149.

29 Alapuro, 22-23.

30 Ibid.

31 Tuomo Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898-1904*, trans. Steven Huxley (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 24-25. One of the main criticisms of Polvinen’s work is that he does not explain the precise details of what Russian “conservative nationalism” is, other than in the most general details. This ties into another theme of early Russo-Finnish relations: the Finns possessed (in the traditional Western sense) a more advanced government and economic system than the broader Russian Empire, but did not occupy the position of power within the power. This odd arrangement possibly explains Alexander I’s decision to keep the Finnish government intact and the later resentment under Nicholas II and Bobrikov, but becomes less relevant after the Finns break away from the empire.

32 See Juhani Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe: The Early Years of Independence, 1917-1939*, ed. and trans. Peter Herring (Helsinki: SHS, 1988), 210-211 on German military intervention, and Vehviläinen, 37-38 on the Hanko Peninsula. Paasivirta’s work, although written after the turn, does not fit neatly into either pre-turn or post-turn scholarship: instead, Paasivirta attempts to marshal a number of facts about the inter-war period without offering an overriding thesis as to what the facts show about Finnish politics or international relationships.

33 Vehviläinen, 28.
Ibid., 82-83, 96.


See Oscar Jaszi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*, 2nd ed. (New York: H. Fertig, 1969), and *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) by the same author. The latter discusses the nationality situation, but in almost pre-Kohn terms: there are descriptions of the Serbs as a “robust peasant people, full of life, scarcely liberate from the Turkish yoke of many centuries, raised in a medieval war-like atmosphere. . . ” (414). In this regard, Jaszi’s work does not anticipate the cultural turn.


See Deak’s Columbia University biography (Istvan Deak, Istvan Deak’s Homepage, http://www.columbia.edu/~id1/ (accessed December 10, 2010) for these specific details, but note also that he vaguely implies at his heritage in the introduction of *The Lawful Revolution* (xviii).


Glatz, 7-13. See 9 in particular for a discussion of assimilation: that discussion has elements of turn-era scholarship (in that nationalities are fluid enough for easy assimilation to be allowed) and pre-turn scholarship (in that the original nationalities matter enough that assimilation is an issue).


A brief note on periodization—since both studies start in the early 19th century, World War I offers the best cut-off point for the “early” and “later” periods in both countries, especially since Hungary and Finland only became fully independent states after WWI and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

See Dreiszinger 107-122, 133-150 for Laszlo’s articles.

Janos, 264-266.

Gellner 13-18, Hobsbawm 69-73, Suny 63.

Alapuro, 223.

Works Consulted


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