

UNIVERSITY OF MARY WASHINGTON
FACULTY RESEARCH GRANT
PROPOSAL COVER SHEET
Due November 3, 2014
Academic Year 2014-2015
Application for Funding in Fiscal Year 2015-2016

Name of Applicant: Elizabeth F. Larus

Department: PSIA

Project Title: Taiwan's Military Modernization

Requested Funding Period (Month/Year-Month/Year): June 2015-June 30, 2016

Funding For: Summer Stipend Project Expenses \$3,500 (*See note below concerning amounts*)

Course Release: Fall 2015 Spring 2016

Required UMW Institutional Review Board Information:

Date Review was submitted 10/30/2014

Check here if IRB is not required for this project

Project Summary (50-75 words):

This project analyzes efforts to modernize Taiwan's military given demographic, economic, budgetary and alliance constraints. It seeks to answer the following questions: What constraints limit Taiwan's ability to modernize its defense forces? Given the constraints, should Taiwan focus on less costly methods of deterrence, such as cyber warfare, or area denial? Do the factors and constraints limit Taiwan's defense to the extent that it would be in Taiwan's interest to seek integration with China rather than continued separation?

Budget Summary:

Itemize and justify the project expenses. If you are requesting a stipend or a course release, you may request a maximum of \$500 in expenses. If your grant request is for expenses only, the maximum is \$3,500.

Applicant Signature: _____

Date: _____

Chair Signature: _____

Date: _____

A. Cover Sheet (attached)

B. Project Narrative

1. Project Description

Project Title: Taiwan's Military Modernization and National Defense

Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC), exists in the shadow of mainland China. Separated by civil war, the government in Beijing is determined to unite Taiwan with China, even by force if necessary. Taiwan seeks to modernize its military to defend against a Chinese attack. Taiwan's military modernization faces some challenges, however. Taiwan's economy is slowing, raising questions about Taiwan's ability to fund a truly defensive military. Once able to rely on the United States for much of its defense capability, Taiwan is less confident of US resolve in countering the Chinese threat. Taiwan's population is aging, leaving fewer young people to fight. This project analyzes efforts to modernize Taiwan's military given economic, budgetary, alliance and demographic constraints. It seeks to answer the following questions: What constraints limit Taiwan's ability to modernize its defense forces? Given the constraints, should Taiwan focus on less costly methods of deterrence, such as cyber warfare, or area denial? Do the aforementioned factors and constraints limit Taiwan's defense to such an extent that it would be in Taiwan's interest to seek integration with China rather than continued separation?

2. Goals, Specific Objectives, and Project Significance

Goals

The goal of this project is to gain a better understanding of existential threats faced by small states, namely Taiwan, and its ability to militarily respond to such threats. Specifically, I seek assess Taiwan's ability to deter Chinese military action against the island.

Specific Objectives

1. Conduct archival research on US arms sales to Taiwan. This aspect of my research involves collecting and analyzing US government reports including public access information from sources such as the Center for Naval Analysis and Department of Defense white papers; reports prepared by think tanks such as Stratfor, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings Institution, Heritage Foundation, and the Congressional Research Service; and reading the academic literature on US arms sales and Taiwan's national security. I also plan to search journals such as *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, *Asian Military Review*, *Asian Perspective*, *Asian Survey*, *Defense Monitor Weekly*, *Defense Studies*, *Issues & Studies* (Taiwan), *Jane's Defense Weekly*, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *US Army War College Quarterly*, *US Naval War College China Maritime Studies* among others. (June 2015)
2. Conduct primary research on US arms sales to Taiwan. I plan to interview public officials in the US Departments of State and Defense and staff of congressional offices, particularly those in the Taiwan lobby in the US House of Representatives. (June 2015)
3. Conduct field research in Taiwan on Taiwan's military modernization. I plan to conduct research at Academia Sinica, the Institute of International Research, Taiwan ThinkTank, and interviews with several scholars and officials in the Ministry of Defense. (July-early August 2015)
4. Present conference papers for the 2016 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the Association for Chinese Studies. (September and October 2016, respectively)

5. Complete and submit an article to a scholarly journal such as *Issues & Studies* or the *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, where I have published before, or to *Asian Survey*. (Nov- Dec. 2016)
6. Offer a public address to Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWACs) personnel at the Naval Surface Warfare Command, Dahlgren, where I previously presented a lectures on security issues in the Asia-Pacific. (Spring 2016)
7. Make a final report available to US policy-makers, including State Department staff and congressional staff, such as that for Rep. Rob Wittman and members of the House Foreign Relations Committee. (Spring 2016).

Project Significance for the Discipline:

For more than sixty years, Taiwan and China have been engaged in a military standoff. Until recently, Taiwan possessed the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, however, China's military modernization has turned the strategic equation against Taiwan rendering it increasingly vulnerable to Chinese attack. In response, Taiwan is making some efforts to modernize its military. This project examines four major factors that will determine the extent of Taiwan's military modernization. These factors are Taiwan's defense budget; US arms sales to Taiwan; a restructuring of Taiwan's military; and the state of cross-Strait (China- Taiwan) relations.

Economic growth rates in Taiwan have decreased in recent years, likely having an impact on future military budget decisions. Taiwan's military spending as a share of GDP has been quite low for an island facing a credible threat, and has gotten lower. Although Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou pledged during his 2008 election campaign to uphold Taiwan's defense budget at 3 per cent of GDP, the budget averaged little more than 2 percent during Ma's presidency. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) claims that it is time to revive national defense. DPP secretary-general Joseph Jiao-shieh Wu said that if the DPP returns to power in 2016, it would increase national defense budgets to at least 3 percent of GDP.

US arms sales to Taiwan and military exchanges also affect Taiwan's military modernization. Taiwan is the US' fourth largest recipient of US arms. Taiwan's request for US arms is contingent on domestic politics in Taiwan, however. Despite Beijing's threat to unite Taiwan with mainland China by force if necessary, decision makers and political parties in Taiwan are divided on the country's arms budget. For instance, from 2000-2008, Taiwan's legislature refused to grant the president's requests to increase military spending. From 2008- 2014, however, the legislature accused the president of not requesting sufficient funding. Taiwan's military modernization is also affected by US support of the ROC's armed forces. For instance, the US Air Force trains Taiwan's F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona; assigns active duty personnel to the US representative office in Taiwan; engages in joint military exercises; engage in high-level defense-related meetings; educates selected military officers at Larus, Taiwan Military the war colleges, among other things. Taiwan's ability to modernize its military is to some extent dependent on sales of advanced US weapons and training support.

The third factor affecting Taiwan's military modernization is restructuring of the military due to changing demographics. An aging population raises the question of a military too small to fight. As a result of changing demographics, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou announced that Taiwan would phase out conscription and create an all-volunteer force. Ma also plans to reduce the size of the military, partly because of concerns that Taiwan will not even be able to man a smaller military. Many young people in Taiwan are shunning military service because of low pay and poor conditions, poor public perception of military careers, and a growing public perception that China will eventually take over Taiwan by economic means anyway. Efforts to increase enlistment by increasing wages and improving living conditions are straining the defense budget, leaving less for weapons purchases and development.

Cross-Strait relations are a fourth factor in Taiwan's military modernization. Taiwan-China relations are warmer than they have been in a decade. Taiwan officials regularly travel to China for talks, cross-Strait economic integration is at an all-time high, and more people from Taiwan are settling in China after retirement or are marrying across the Strait. Given these factors, many people in Taiwan question the cost and effort of military modernization, particularly given Taiwan's slowing economy.

I chose this project because of its significance for security studies in the Asia-Pacific, but also for small states in general. An existential threat from a larger and more powerful neighbor is not exclusive to Taiwan. Russia's increasing assertiveness likewise threatens the independent sovereign status of the Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Liberal school of international relations emphasizes the concept of collective security (military action against one state is considered a threat against all, thereby invoking a response from all states, not just the state under threat). The Realist school views puts less faith in international action and more on military alliances among individual nation-states as a deterrent to threats. This project uses Realist theory to explain Taiwan's situation and its response to the China threat. Being a pariah state internationally,¹ there is less than zero chance that the United Nations will invoke collective security on Taiwan's behalf. In an anarchical international system in which there is no supranational body keeping all states in line, Taiwan like the other small states must look out for their own defense. Realists would argue that each of these regimes, like Taiwan, needs to devise a realistic national defense. Defensive measures include improving readiness and military operational capabilities by engaging in military alliances with other countries, buying arms from other countries, and/or developing indigenous arms.

¹ Most of the world does not recognize the ROC's sovereignty, and Taiwan does not have a seat in the UN.

Significance for Mary Washington

I plan to use my research findings in several of my courses at UMW. For instance, I plan to integrate my findings into PSCI 102 Introduction to International Relations by relating a number of themes from the project to the course, such as discussions of international relations theory, conflict and cooperation, and national security issues. I can use my findings in PSCI 367 East Asia in World Affairs, where we analyze and discuss the international politics of the Asia-Pacific, and debate thorny issues, such as US commitment to Taiwan's security. I can use my finding in a new seminar, PSCI 471 Political Risk Analysis, where students assess the risk of investing in (whether it is private investment or foreign aid) in politically uncertain regimes. The Larus, Taiwan Military project will also help me better supervise independent studies on international relations and theses for Asian studies minors. The project helps enhance my standing as a scholar who conducts archival and field research on timely and important topics. Disseminating my findings in the aforementioned products not only helps me as a scholar, but promotes UMW as a liberal arts institution serious about faculty research. As a productive member of the UMW faculty, I am also active in professional organizations, and every one of my presentations and publications is another valuable opportunity to enhance UMW's reputation.

3. Procedure and Methods

I am the primary investigator for this project. I plan to conduct archival research and interviews in the US in summer 2015, and conduct field research in Taiwan in later summer 2015. I will compile findings and prepare results for dissemination and publication in fall 2015 and spring 2016.

I will begin the project in summer 2015 with a review of the existing literature on Taiwan's current military hardware and proposed US arms purchases. This phase will focus on the following questions: What factors contribute to US

arms sales to Taiwan? How do US arms sales support Taiwan's military? I plan to conduct this phase of the project in the United States, conducting archival research online (Taiwan Security.org; National Bureau of Asian Research; 2049 Project, among others), at the Taiwan Studies Center at George Washington University's Sigur Center for Asian Affairs; and in the USMC library at Quantico. I will begin with articles in academic journals such as *Asia Policy*, *Asian Survey*, *International Affairs*, *International Organization*, *Issues & Studies*, *Journal of Asian Studies*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Strategic Vision* (Taiwan) and *World Affairs*. Key sources of academic information and policy papers that do not appear in academic journals include Stratfor (*the* premier site for strategic intelligence on global security and geopolitical affairs); the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA); Global Security.org; and Taiwan Security Research.

Because documents do not tell the whole story, I also plan to discuss this issue with Congressional staff working for members of Congress on key Asia-related committees, contacts at the Department of Defense, and Asia scholars. I would *start* with the following people, most of whom I know through scholarly and professional activities:

- Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service
- Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation
- Daniel Hartnett, Center for Naval Analysis
- Randy Shriver, Project 2049
- David Firestein, EastWest (sic) Institute
- Lt. Col. Scott McDonald, USMC Operations Command
- Richard Bush, Director of East Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Institution and former head of AIT (American Institute in Taiwan), the US *de facto* embassy in Taiwan
- Timothy Walton, Principal at Alios Consulting

In addition to my archival research, I plan to conduct field research in Taiwan in summer 2015. I have been conducting field research in Taiwan since 1990. During those research visits, I met and maintained contact with many of Taiwan's foremost analysts of issues concerning Taiwan's security. In Taiwan, I will be able to conduct research and reside at National Chengchi University, Taiwan Military University (NCCU), which has already welcomed me to conduct research in its facilities. (See Appendix.) My contact there is Dr. Li Ming, Dean of the College of International Affairs. I also plan to conduct archival research at NCCU's think tank, the Institute of International Relations, particularly at IIR's Center for Strategic Studies (CSS). I also plan to consult with scholars at Academia Sinica, Taiwan's premier think tank; and at the Taiwan Forum and at the Institute for Policy Research, two non-partisan think tanks. Contacts in Taiwan include, *but are not limited to* Tung Cheng-yuan, NCCU; Philip Yang Yong-min, former advisor to Taiwan's National Security Council; Ho Sze-yin, Deputy National Security Advisor to Taiwan's National Security Council; Su Chi, former director of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council; and Drs. Wu Lin-jun, Lee Chyungly, Hsu Szu-chien and Chen Chih-chieh all of IIR; Leng Tse-kang, Wu Yu-Shan, Joanne Jaw-ling Chang, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai of Academia Sinica; Lin Cheng-yi, Chang Chung-yung, Yuan-ming Alvin Yao, and Tseng Jang-ruey of CSS; and Deputy Minister for National Defense General Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) and LtCol. Edward Hsieh, Taiwan National Defense University.

4. Results

I will present my research findings in conference presentations, a scholarly article, public addresses, and course lectures at UMW. I will complete the conference paper by mid-August 2016 in time for presentation at the fall 2016 meetings of the American Political Science Association and of the American Association of Chinese Studies. I plan to

submit a scholarly article to academic journals such as *Issues & Studies* (Taiwan) and to *Asian Survey*. Because of UMW's close proximity to Washington, D.C., I can disseminate my findings to think tanks (such as Brookings, Heritage, Center for Strategic International Studies) and to the Taiwan Resource Center (TRC) at the Gelman Library at George Washington University. I will make a final report available to US policy-makers, including congressional staff, particularly those associated with the three co-chairs of the Taiwan Caucus in the House of Representatives, such as Congressmen John Carter, Mario Diaz-Balart and Albio Sires; and with key staff members of the Foreign Relations committee in the Senate and the Foreign Affairs committee in the House. I will also bring a copy of my final report to Dr. (Ambassador) Shen Lyu-shen, Taiwan's Representative to the United States, with whom I have a strong professional relationship. I plan to present my findings to personnel at the Naval Surface Warfare Command at Dahlgren, to students of the PSIA department's soon-to-be-established Master's program in National Security Studies, and students enrolled in my courses PSCI 101 Introduction to International Relations, PSCI 366 Government and Politics of China, PSCI 367 East Asia in World Affairs, and the proposed seminar PSCI 471 Political Risk Analysis.

C. Documentation

Three broad areas of scholarly literature are central to this project: international relations theory; security studies concerning small states; and the politics, economy, and national defense of Taiwan.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan. "Taiwan's Strategic Goals and Action Plan," Center for Security Studies (Taiwan) report, May 31, 2012. [www.http://mcsstw.org/web/content.php?PID=5&N=959](http://mcsstw.org/web/content.php?PID=5&N=959).

Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle, eds. *Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices and Security Challenges*. Abingdon, Oxen and New York: Routledge, 2014. Larus, Taiwan Military

Cheng, Dean. *F-16 C/D Fills Taiwan's Fighter Need*. Issue Brief 3960. The Heritage Foundation. www.hertitage.org/research/reports/2013/06/taiwan-air-force-modernization-plan-and-procurement-of-f-16cd.

Matthew Crandall. "Soft Security Threats and Small States: The Case of Estonia," *Defense Studies*, 14(1) (2014): 30-55.

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Inbar, Efraim and Gabriel Sheffer. *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.

Kan, Shirley A. *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy, Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. October 10, 2014.

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<http://report.mnd.gov.tw/m/minister.html>

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Minnick, Wendell. China Espionage Now Rampant in Taiwan," *Defense News*, October 11, 2014.
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141011/DEFREG/310110021/Chinese-Espionage-Now-Rampant-Taiwan>.

Mizokami, Kyle. "How Taiwan Would Defend Against a China Attack," USNI (US Naval Intelligence) News, March 26, 2014. <http://news.usni.org/2014/03/26/taiwan-defend-chinese-attack> Larus, Taiwan Military

7 Reiter, Erich and Heinz Gartner *Small States and Alliances: The Case of Slovenia*. Heidelberg ; New York : Physica-Verlag, 2001.

Rigger, Shelley. *Does Taiwan Matter?* London: Routledge, 2012.

Shambaugh, David L. *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Speller, Ian. *Understanding Naval Warfare*. London: Routledge, 2014.

"Taiwan Military: China Able to Invade by 2020," Agence France-Presse, *Defense News*, October 8, 2013.

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131008/DEFREG03/310080008/Taiwan-military-China-able-invade-by-2020>.

"Taiwan's Force Modernization: the American Side," *Defense Industry Daily*, October 30, 2014.
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141011/DEFREG/310110021/Chinese-Espionage-Now-Rampant-Taiwan>.

Tsang, Steve. *If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Policy and Economic Implications*. London: Routledge, 2006.

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D. Budget

I request a grant of \$3500 in expenses. My annual \$500 faculty development monies are earmarked to help defray expenses associated with participating in the 2015 meeting of the American Political Science Association to be held in San Francisco, September 3-6, 2015.

Airfare from Washington to Taipei \$1850

Accommodation (20 nights) at

NCCU I-House @ \$50/night 1000

Per Diem (21 days) @ \$105/day 2205

Ground transportation in Taiwan

(subway and a taxis) 210

Copying (300pp @ US.05/page) 15

Total \$5280

I realize that this amount exceeds the \$3500 maximum amount for expenses. I will personally pay for the amount that exceeds the \$3500 award. I am using the state per diem of \$105 for Taipei. In all honesty, I will not likely consume \$105 of food per day. I am not using the state per diem for accommodation because I will stay at National Cheng-chi University International House (I-House) for \$50 per night, which is far less than the \$175 lodging rate for Taipei. Larus, Taiwan Military

E. Simultaneous Application

I have no other applications outstanding.

F. Previous Awards

I received a Faculty Research Grant in 2012, a Faculty Supplemental Development Grant for Summer 2014, and a Faculty Supplemental Development Grant for Fall 2014. These awards are unrelated to the proposed project. Prior to 2012, I last received a Faculty Research Grant in 2006.

G. Report

I will submit the final report, with a description of the results obtained and a copy of a conference paper or research article, to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences by May 15, 2016.

Appendix 1 Invitation from School of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University Re: UVA scholar inquiry research at NCCU

minglee.nccu@gmail.com[minglee.nccu@gmail.com] on behalf of 李明 [minglee@nccu.edu.tw]

You replied on 6/26/2014 1:50 PM.

Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2014 10:47 PM

To: Elizabeth Larus (elarus)

Cc: Albert Lei [lclei@nccu.edu.tw]

Dear Liz:

Thank you for the mails, in fact, I received both of them. Buit please pardon me for not being able to respond to your request immediately since I had too many mails and also was stuck by administrative work.

I felt very pleased to have your information and interest back to Taipei for research--that means we will have reunion for Wahoo-wa's. You are more than welcome to come back, I join with my colleagues in anticipating your arrival. I'll pass your letters to my colleague for further arrangements. We can try the I-House of this university for your future accommodations, the I-House has a reasonable tariff and convenient location to the campus. I think it is highly possible that we could make a reservation.

I miss the UVa so much, and possibly we could share some mutual memories after you arrive. Let's keep in touch, and best regards,

Ming Lee

Professor & Dean

College of International Affairs

National Chengchi University

3,494 words